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A process study of effectuation and causation 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The process of new venture creation is characterized by the need to decide and take action in the 
face of uncertainty. Especially in the context of technology-based ventures uncertainty is 
substantial, posing difficulties for strategic decision-making based on prediction and planning. 
As alternative, more flexible and adaptive decision-making logics are being advanced. This study 
draws upon effectuation and causation as examples of planning-based and flexible decision-
making logics, and investigates dynamics in the use of both logics. The study applies a 
longitudinal process research approach to investigate strategic decision-making in new venture 
creation over time. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, we analyze 385 decision 
events across nine technology-based ventures. Our observations suggest a hybrid perspective on 
strategic decision-making, demonstrating how effectuation and causation logics are combined, 
and how entrepreneurs’ emphasis on these logics shifts and re-shifts over time. From our data, 
we induce a dynamic model which extends the literature on strategic decision-making in venture 
creation, illustrating how external and venture conditions - including not only uncertainty but 
also resource position and stakeholder pressure - lead to changes in venture scope, and thereby to 
shifts in the use of decision-making logics.  
KEYWORDS 
 
decision-making, effectuation, new venture creation, uncertainty, process research, venture 
scoping 
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INTRODUCTION 
The process of new venture creation is characterized by the need to decide and take action in the 
face of uncertainty (e.g., Alvarez and Barney, 2005; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Sarasvathy, 
2001), and this is particularly the case for technology-based ventures. The nature and outcome of 
their technology development activities, as well as market selection and commercialization 
processes, are not just risky but inherently unpredictable and fraught with ‘ambiguity’ or 
‘Knightian uncertainty’ (Chesbrough, 2003; Steensma et al., 2000; Utterback, 1987). Alvarez 
and Barney (2005) and Alvarez (2007) explain that this uncertainty makes it difficult for the 
entrepreneur to know how to organize the emerging venture (such as deciding how to assign the 
residual profits of an opportunity, and to make decisions about acquiring and coordinating 
resources). They argue that we need a better understanding of the decision-making tools that 
entrepreneurs use to organize ventures in such uncertain contexts. We focus on this important 
mechanism, i.e. entrepreneurial decision-making logics, and contribute more broadly to 
understanding the role of strategic decision-making in the venture creation process under 
conditions of uncertainty.  
The entrepreneurship literature describes several approaches to decision-making in the face 
of uncertainty, including approaches that stress planning and control (e.g., Brinckmann et al., 
2010; Delmar and Shane, 2003; Miller and Cardinal, 1994) and approaches that emphasize more 
flexible, adaptive and collaborative decision-making such as improvisation (e.g., Baker et al., 
2003), bricolage (Baker and Nelson, 2005) and effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001). However, 
planning-based approaches appear to have limited success in contexts characterized by true 
uncertainty, as plans based on past predictions often do no longer accurately reflect the unfolding 
course of events in such contexts (Alvarez and Parker, 2009; Brinckmann et al., 2010; Chwolka 
and Raith, 2012; Dencker et al., 2009; Gruber, 2007). In contrast, more flexible, experimenting 
	  4	  
	  
and adaptive approaches appear to better fit with uncertain decision-making contexts (Alvarez 
and Parker, 2009; Andries et al., 2013). It has been suggested that venture creation benefits from 
a planning-based approach in the absence of uncertainty, while a collaborative, flexible decision-
making is crucial for venture creation under uncertainty (Alvarez and Barney, 2005; Sarasvathy 
2001). In uncertain contexts, decision-making needs to be adaptive over time and responsive to 
the change and instability inherent in such contexts. So far however, no research has explored 
how decision-making logics are used over time, how they may shift over the course of the 
venture creation process, and what specific conditions might trigger such shifts (e.g., Alvarez et 
al., 2013; Read and Dolmans, 2012). The current study addresses this gap by shedding light on 
whether, how, and why decision-making logics might be alternated or combined, i.e., adapted, 
over time.  
As discussed above, several planning-based and flexible decision-making logics exist. This 
study specifically focuses on causation and effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001), as examples of a 
planning and a flexible decision-making logic, which have gained increasing interest in the 
strategic entrepreneurship literature, have been articulated in relation to each other, and imply a 
process focus. An effectual decision-making logic, in contrast to a causal one, describes how 
entrepreneurs actively engage uncertainty by being responsive to information and feedback, and 
by leveraging existing means and stakeholder contacts that may change over time (Read et al., 
2009b; Sarasvathy, 2001; Wiltbank et al., 2006). As is the case for planning-based and flexible 
decision-making logics in general, our understanding of how effectual and causal decision-
making logics evolve over time is still underdeveloped, as is our knowledge of what drives the 
use of either logic at a given time (Arend et al., 2015).  
A process approach is needed for a more comprehensive explanation of entrepreneurial 
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decision-making in venture creation. Not only do strategic entrepreneurial decisions shape a 
venture over time, but also the conditions that may impact decision-making evolve during the 
venture creation process. As decision-making logics are context-dependent (Alvarez and Barney, 
2005; 2007), and the context - in particular the level and type of uncertainty - changes over time, 
entrepreneurs are likely to shift from one logic to another or to combine different logics (Read 
and Sarasvathy, 2005). Restricting the explanation of the drivers of decision-making logics to 
initial conditions obscures how entrepreneurs act upon such conditions, react to perceived 
changes, and shape their own process (e.g., McMullen and Dimov, 2013). A process approach 
also helps to move beyond the discussion of causation and effectuation as competing approaches 
to decision-making. It can shed light on whether, how, and why decision-making logics might be 
alternated or combined, thereby also increasing the understanding of the relationship between 
decision-making logics in the venture creation process.  
This study adds a longitudinal process approach (Langley, 1999) to the body of research on 
entrepreneurial strategic decision-making under uncertainty. In particular, it addresses the 
following questions: (1) How does the use of effectual and causal decision-making evolve during 
the venture creation process? and (2) What may drive shifts in the use of effectual and causal 
decision-making? To answer these questions, we combine qualitative and quantitative methods 
to analyze 385 decision events across nine technology-based ventures.  
Collectively, our findings advance the theoretical understanding of strategic decision-
making in venture creation processes and add to the literature on strategic decision-making under 
uncertainty. First, we contribute a hybrid perspective to the literature on strategic decision-
making by demonstrating how ventures combine effectual and causal logics in key decisions 
along the development process (rather than using one or the other logic exclusively) and how the 
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emphasis in the use of the logics shifts over time. Second, we advance a novel, dynamic model 
of what drives entrepreneurs’ strategic decision-making, thereby extending the literature on 
planning-based and flexible decision-making approaches in venture creation. Our findings 
support and extend the work by Alvarez and Barney (2005) by showing that perceived changes 
in external and venture conditions (including uncertainty but also resource position and 
stakeholder pressures) lead to shifts in the use of decision-making logics. Third, we add to the 
emerging literature on venture scoping by highlighting the mediating role of venture scoping 
between perceived venture conditions and the use of strategic decision-making logics. Thus, 
scoping decisions are immediate conditions influencing the use of strategic decision-making 
logics in venture creation processes. We define the scope of a venture as the set of technologies, 
product offerings, or markets that the entrepreneurs consider or target at a particular moment in 
time.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Decision-making under uncertainty 
Entrepreneurial firms “are organized under conditions of uncertainty, and their primary purpose 
is to solve transaction difficulties associated with the inability to know the value of an exchange 
at the time that exchange is commenced”, as Alvarez and Barney (2005, p. 788) state. 
Uncertainty –in contrast to risk– refers to an unspecific and unpredictable context, i.e., outcomes 
can neither be foreseen nor linked to probabilities in a-priori decision-making processes. More 
specifically, uncertainty is defined as a lack of knowledge and therefore an inability to predict a 
state, effect or response of the environment relative to the venture’s own actions (McKelvie et 
al., 2011; Milliken, 1987). It dominates decision-making in the early venture stage and weighs 
even more heavily for technology-based ventures, where both the technology and the market are 
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sources of uncertainty (Atuahene-Gima and Haiyang, 2004). 
A key difference between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial decision-making is that 
entrepreneurial decision-making happens in uncertain environments whereas non-entrepreneurial 
decision-making takes places under conditions of risk (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). As 
entrepreneurial decision-making is thus a key element of a successful organizing process under 
uncertainty, the question arises which decision-making tools or logics to use under these 
conditions. Traditionally, analysis and planning are seen as means to reduce uncertainty. For 
instance, Anderson and Tushman (2001) find that technology ventures ‘try to fit themselves to 
the environments they expect to encounter’ (p. 683, italics added). Alvarez and Barney (2005) 
propose that planning-based causal decision-making is useful when data and information are 
abundantly available and reliable. Under such conditions decision-making is consistent with 
transaction costs economics, as information is available to assign residual rights and to take other 
important venture organizing decisions. However, how the market will develop often depends on 
many decisions by various actors, and clarity will only exist after the fact, i.e., after 
entrepreneurial activities have shaped an industry’s development (Dutta and Crossan, 2005). 
When there is no or limited reliable information about the future, the effectiveness of prediction 
and planning in such highly uncertain settings appears to be limited (Brinckmann et al., 2010; 
Chwolka and Raith, 2012; Gruber, 2007). Instead, a collaborative, flexible decision-making 
approach is expected to benefit venture creation processes under uncertainty (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2005).  
One such flexible, adaptive decision-making logic is effectuation, as an alternative to 
causation, which is a planning-based decision-making logic (Sarasvathy, 2001). In contrast to 
causation, effectuation actively embraces uncertainty and increases control through co-creative 
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processes that start from existing means and accumulate commitments (and resources), which in 
turn allow ideas to converge and specific goals to emerge (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). We draw 
on the distinction between effectuation and causation as specific decision-making logics because 
it emerged in the field of entrepreneurship (Sarasvathy, 2001), has developed into an established 
perspective, and has proven its value in broader domains including strategy (Wiltbank et al., 
2006) and innovation (Berends et al., 2014; Brettel et al., 2012). Further, effectuation and 
causation are processual concepts, thus fitting our process research approach. Finally, the 
conceptualization of effectuation and causation is especially useful because these decision-
making logics are articulated in a balanced way by differentiating them systematically on a set of 
underlying dimensions. This facilitates empirical research into the relative use of these logics in 
venture creation processes. 
Effectual and Causal Decision-Making Logics 
Effectual and causal decision-making are commonly differentiated along four dimensions or 
principles, although their precise character can vary slightly across publications (Brettel et al., 
2012; Chandler et al., 2011; Dew et al., 2009; Fisher, 2012; Sarasvathy, 2001). We follow the 
theoretical exposition that effectuation reduces uncertainty through emphasizing control - as 
opposed to emphasizing prediction in causation – and, thus, that effectuation and causation can 
be contrasted on four decision-making principles regarding (1) the basis for taking action, (2) the 
attitude towards unexpected events, (3) the attitude towards outsiders, and (4) the view on risk 
and resources. We thus follow most closely the approach of Dew et al. (2009), while also taking 
into account the approaches of Chandler et al. (2011) and Brettel et al. (2012). 
Basis for taking action  
The overall logic of how one arrives at the decision to act differs fundamentally for effectuation 
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versus causation. Causation takes a certain goal or effect as given, and focuses on selecting the 
means to reach that effect; like cooking based on a recipe. Under a causal logic, entrepreneurs or 
venture teams start by setting a goal. They subsequently map the environment by analyzing 
competitors, market trends, and perceived competitive advantage. Based on this analysis, they 
devise a strategic plan to mobilize the right resources to achieve the set goal (e.g., Brinckmann et 
al., 2010; Miller and Cardinal, 1994). In contrast, effectuation takes the set of individual means 
available to the venture as the starting point for decision-making, and focuses on working 
towards possible effects that can be created with these means; like opening a refrigerator and 
creating a dish with the given ingredients (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). 
Attitude towards unexpected events  
Effectual and causal logics differ in the way entrepreneurs or venture teams react to their market 
environment and deal with unforeseeable events. Causation aims to carry out a strategy as 
planned, negatively reacting to any unexpected events that may arise, which are seen as 
interruptions to the execution of the strategy (Garud and Van de Ven, 1992; Van de Ven and 
Polley, 1992; Choi et al., 2008). Effectuation, in contrast, is an adaptive feedback-seeking and 
feedback-incorporating process. This adaptability keeps effectual decision-making sufficiently 
open to be able to leverage unexpected events for the benefit of the venture (Chandler et al., 
2011).  
Attitude towards outsiders  
The two logics also differ with regard to how the focal venture interacts with and involves other 
people and organizations in the venture creation process. Entrepreneurs utilizing a causal logic 
tend to protect knowledge from outsiders, using it to build their competitive advantage, for 
instance through developing dedicated intellectual property protection strategies (Chesbrough, 
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2006). If they partner with other ventures, then such alliances are planned for, partners are 
carefully selected based on complementary competencies to fulfill the focal organization’s goals, 
and alliance contracts judiciously specify responsibilities (e.g., Read et al., 2009a). The literature 
on strategic alliances exemplifies this causal tradition (e.g., Walter et al., 2010). In contrast, 
under an effectual logic, venture creation processes are open for, and indeed contingent on, the 
involvement of other people and organizations as committed stakeholders. Stakeholders bring 
access to resources, but at the same time also reduce uncertainty and shape the very goals and 
direction of the venture (Read et al., 2009a). Draft products, for example, are exposed to 
potential clients to elicit feedback, and potentially attract new stakeholders. 
View on risk and resources  
The two logics also differ fundamentally with regard to the size and flexibility of investments 
sought and made. A causal approach is based on a well-defined business plan and typically seeks 
large investments that allow maximizing expected returns, based on the calculation of different 
possible scenarios. In contrast, effectuation highlights the inherent unpredictability of the 
environment. Rather than asking investors and founders to invest as much as possible to 
maximize potential future returns, the focus is on the current situation and on assets under the 
control of investors and founders. Investments should be no larger than what each individual can 
afford to lose (Dew et al., 2009). This means that typically ‘small step’ investments are made, 
and available resources in the local environment are mobilized or re-purposed (cf., 
‘bootstrapping’, e.g., Bhide, 1992; Winborg and Landström, 2001).   
Opposing, independent or compatible logics?  
Effectuation and causation are often introduced as opposing decision-making logics. However, 
they may not have to be mutually exclusive (Sarasvathy, 2008). In fact, it could be that optimal 
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decisions result from a combination of both logics, where the causal logic ensures that the 
venture stays focused and predicts what is predictable, while effectual decision-making allows 
responding flexibly to changing circumstances and maintaining hands-on control over uncertain 
aspects of the venture. 
Empirical evidence on how effectuation and causation relate to each other is scarce and 
conflicting. Some studies find evidence that individual entrepreneurs may combine both logics 
(Sarasvathy, 2008; Dew et al., 2009; Fisher, 2012), whilst other studies conceptualize them as 
polar opposites (Brettel et al., 2012; Corner and Ho, 2010), and still other researchers suggest 
they may be largely independent of each other (Chandler et al., 2011; Perry et al., 2012). Yet, to 
advance research on strategic-decision-making in venture creation processes, we need to develop 
a robust understanding of our key concepts (Arend et al., 2015; Perry et al., 2012), which 
includes the relationship between effectuation and causation and how they may evolve over time.  
Effectual and causal decision-making over time 
Prior research on effectuation and causation has investigated the degree to which these logics are 
used, both in experimental studies (e.g., Sarasvathy, 2008; Dew et al., 2009; Read et al., 2009a), 
single shot surveys (e.g., Chandler et al., 2011; Brettel et al., 2012; Politis et al., 2012) and field 
studies (e.g., Corner and Ho, 2010; Fisher, 2012), but always at a single moment in time or by 
treating the whole entrepreneurial journey as a single observation (see Perry et al., 2012 for a 
review). In these cross-sectional studies, differences in the use of effectuation and causation have 
been explained by initial founding conditions, primarily entrepreneurial experience (e.g., Dew et 
al., 2009; Politis et al. 2012) and uncertainty due to the novelty of the market or the radicalness 
of an innovation (Sarasvathy, 2008; Brettel et al., 2012).  
It is surprising that no research to date has investigated potential shifts in the use of these 
	  12	  
	  
logics over time, given that effectuation theory proposes endogenous, path-dependent processes, 
which in addition to variation in perceived uncertainty lead to variation in the use of effectuation 
and causation over time (e.g., Sarasvathy, 2008; Wiltbank et al., 2006). The lack of process-
research on effectuation means that our understanding of the conditions influencing the use of 
effectuation and causation is still underdeveloped.  
Despite the absence of empirical research, a conjecture with regard to such longitudinal 
dynamics can be distilled from prior research and theory. Effectual and causal logics may be 
particularly suitable for specific development phases in a venture’s life time, such as the use of 
effectual decision-making during venture start-up when uncertainty is arguably particularly high 
(e.g., Alvarez and Barney, 2005; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Sarasvathy 2008). Once the 
venture expands and endures over time, it is more likely to grow through causal decision-
making. Similarly, research found planning to be relatively less effective in young, small 
ventures (Brinckmann et al., 2010).  
Taken together, these arguments suggest that a process research approach (Langley, 1999) 
can help to gain a more comprehensive understanding of entrepreneurial decision-making. A 
process approach focuses on longitudinal dynamics. Thus it allows us to explore patterns of 
effectuation and causation over the course of a venture’s development and to examine drivers of 
effectuation and causation beyond initial conditions. This approach pays tribute to 
entrepreneurship as a process that involves self-regulation and agency, where entrepreneurs act 
upon initial conditions, react to perceived changes, and shape their ventures’ development 
process (cf. McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Wiltbank et al., 2006).  
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research approach 
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Adopting a process research approach (Langley, 1999), we analyzed nine technology ventures 
in-depth. We documented these ventures’ development processes as a sequence of decision 
events ‘that describe how things change over time’ (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 197) with the aim of 
analyzing these decision event lists for the use of effectual and causal decision-making logics 
and their potential influencing conditions. Our multiple case study design enabled us to analyze 
both within-case variation over time and cross-case variation (Gerring, 2007).  
Case selection 
Because our aim was to extend theory on decision-making dynamics in venture creation, we used 
purposeful sampling to select cases, by seeking information-rich cases that facilitate theoretical 
inference (Gerring, 2007; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The selected cases had to be similar 
with respect to several criteria. First, all ventures had to be founded in the same geographical 
region, facing highly similar institutional contexts. All cases originated in the Eindhoven-
Leuven-Aachen triangle (ELAt), a geographical area in the Dutch, Belgian and German cross-
border region where high-technology, knowledge-based industries account for 20% of regional 
GDP. The region is characterized by cross-border networks and support activities, including 
cross-border business parks and cross-border entrepreneurial education initiatives. Second, the 
ventures in our study had to be active in high-technology industries and engage in developing 
new technology, as we wanted to study ventures that faced substantial uncertainty. The nature 
and the outcome of such ventures’ technological activities, as well as their market selection and 
commercialization processes, are inherently unpredictable and characterized by ambiguity. A 
third selection criterion was that the ventures allowed the collection of detailed information on 
the development of decision-making logics over a longer time span, from early emergence stages 
up to the phase in which they generated business. Although the ventures differed in age, they had 
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all gone through similar phases in their development path. 
Within the limits of these three criteria, we applied maximum variation sampling to find 
‘important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having 
emerged out of heterogeneity’ (Patton, 2002, p. 235). We included cases that differed with regard 
to the two main conditions influencing the use of effectual and causal decision-making identified 
in the literature to date: level of experience and level of uncertainty (represented by varying 
levels of market newness; all cases faced technological uncertainty). Thus we selected: (1) cases 
where founders had extensive entrepreneurial experience as well as cases with moderate, or low 
entrepreneurial experience (Sarasvathy, 2008); and (2) ventures that targeted new markets with 
new technologies and ventures that targeted existing markets with new technologies (Sarasvathy 
and Dew, 2005).  
Taken together, maximum variation sampling led to diversity among cases. This increased 
the likelihood of selecting cases that displayed variety in the use of effectuation and causation 
logic over time, enabling more robust theory development (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Moreover, by limiting our selection to ventures that were active in high-tech sectors, and that 
originated in the same geographical region, we ensure that observed differences in effectual or 
causal decision-making are not due to sectoral or regional differences. The ventures were all 
founded by teams consisting of two to four entrepreneurs who also represent their initial 
employee bases. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the nine cases.  
====Insert Table 1 and 2 about here ==== 
Data collection 
We conducted interviews with multiple respondents and collected archival documents to 
triangulate information (Yin, 2009). Data was collected between January and September 2010. 
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Table 1 summarizes the data for each case. 
 First, we conducted a total of 56 semi-structured interviews, which lasted on average 1.5 
hours and were conducted by one to three interviewers. We interviewed members of the 
entrepreneurial teams who founded the venture. In all cases, we interviewed at least one of the 
founders who was active in the venture during the entire period covered. We also interviewed 
other important stakeholders to triangulate entrepreneurs’ reports including key employees, 
investors, key customers, board members, and university technology transfer officers among 
others. Interviewees first elaborated on their role in the venture and described the development 
trajectory of the venture. Subsequent interview topics included founding team and employees, 
products/services and innovation, clients, revenues, investments, competition and industry, IP, 
location and facilities, future and sustainability. Each interview was recorded and transcribed.  
Second, we triangulated interview data with archival documents, which also helped to 
counterbalance potential retrospective bias in interviewee reports (see below). The 494 archival 
documents consisted of annual reports, strategic planning documents, patents, company 
presentations, newspaper articles, web articles and public interviews.  
Data coding 
We coded the data in two steps: we first created a list of key decision events in the development 
of each venture, and then coded each of the events for effectuation and causation. 
Creation of decision event lists 
We used the iterative procedures developed by Van de Ven and Poole (1990) and Poole et al. 
(2000) to identify key decision events using information from the interviews and documents 
(similar to, for example, Jain and Sharma, 2013). Decision events were defined as actions or 
decisions taken by the entrepreneurial teams for creating the venture. Thus, we took the 
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perspective of the members of the entrepreneurial team in the identification of decision events 
and the decision events had to involve their intentionality. Examples are: introducing a first 
product idea, contacting a potential customer, acquiring funding, initiating collaboration with a 
supplier, deciding about new production facilities, and hiring an employee. Decisions by other 
stakeholders, such as venture capitalists and customers, were not coded as decision events. We 
coded conservatively, meaning that we only coded what was explicit in the data and did not infer 
intentionality. Decision events had to be significant, i.e., they had to have a potential important 
impact on the venture creation process. The resulting impact was not considered to be part of the 
decision event itself to avoid success bias. Past research shows that individuals recall significant 
decision events well and accurately (Chell, 2004). To mitigate potential retrospective bias, we 
only included decision events mentioned by at least one of the founders (who we consider key 
informants, Huber and Power, 1985), and at the same time by at least one other source (e.g., 
interviews and/or documents). This way we tapped into potential differences in perspectives and 
emotional involvement, so that biases or lapses in the founder’s report were likely to be offset by 
other informants (Golden, 1992; Huber and Power, 1985).  
For each decision event we recorded its time of occurrence, creating chronologically ordered 
decision event lists. Past research demonstrates that the creation of event lists ensures particularly 
accurate and complete retrieval of retrospective reports (Belli, 1998). We also coded for each 
event to which venture creation phase it belonged, using the four phases described by Clarysse 
and Moray (2004) –idea phase, pre-start-up, start-up and post-start-up phase– as an analytic 
tool1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Events taking place before the decision to start-up a company were categorized in the idea phase. Events after this 
decision but before the formal legislation of the company were categorized in the pre-start-up phase. The formal 
legislation of the company and subsequent events up until the shift from technological development to	  generating 
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Decision events were identified by at least two researchers who had collected the data for a 
particular case. These researchers independently examined information from the data sources to 
identify events. There were only very few disagreements about events and their interpretation. 
These disagreements were first discussed between the researchers and if they could not be 
resolved, the event was discussed in the entire team of six researchers to ensure consistent 
interpretation of events (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). QSR Nvivo software was used to 
maintain a chain of evidence between raw data and decision event descriptions. The final 
decision event lists for each case contained between 32 and 50 decision events per case (385 
decision events in total) and enabled us to consider single decision events as well as their 
longitudinal implications (Langley, 1999). 
Coding for effectuation and causation 
Building on studies like Chandler et al. (2011), Read et al. (2009b) and Fisher (2012), we 
considered effectual and causal decision-making at the level of ventures, by focusing on 
decisions taken by the entrepreneurial teams for the ventures, and not at the level of individuals. 
As explained in the theoretical background, we follow Dew et al. (2009) in differentiating 
effectuation and causation on four dimensions. To be able to gauge whether effectuation and 
causation may co-occur, we follow Chandler et al. (2011) and treat effectuation and causation as 
independent constructs. We created a balanced coding scheme consisting of two theoretical 
categories based on effectuation and causation theory, i.e., one effectuation and one causation 
category, with four dimensions for each category (see Table 3). For each of these dimensions, we 
created a set of empirical indicators, iterating between the literature (especially Read et al. 
(2009a), Dew et al. (2009) and Sarasvathy (2008)) and our empirical data.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
business were categorized in the start-up phase. All decision events representing this latter shift and subsequent 
events were categorized in the post-start-up phase.	  
	  18	  
	  
Specifically, we developed the coding scheme in four steps. First, all six coders contributed 
to an initial collection of empirical indicators based on the literature, which was discussed until 
consensus was reached on an initial list of codes for empirical indicators, consisting of opposing 
items for effectuation and causation. Second, each research team coded one of their own cases 
using this initial list of codes. Discussing the coding results among all teams led to slight changes 
in the empirical indicators, to resolve inconsistencies, clarify understanding of the indicators and 
to make sure that they matched the dimensions of effectuation or causation. In a third step, we 
further aligned the coding process: The authors jointly coded 20 decision events of the same 
case. Discussions about the differences in coding led to further minor changes in the empirical 
indicators. In a fourth step, the authors independently coded 20 decision events of each case 
using the revised final coding scheme consisting of 36 codes for the different empirical 
indicators. Inter-rater agreement was high with 0.83 percent agreement. Table 3 presents the final 
coding scheme and displays examples of coded events. 
==== Insert Table 3 about here ==== 
 In a next step, all decision events were coded by two coders independently. Each event was 
coded based on the event list in conjunction with the primary interview and document data. This 
way the coding took the event’s connection to prior events into account. Differences between 
coders were resolved through discussion. To re-iterate, each decision event could be coded as 
corresponding to four effectual and four causal dimensions, thus effectual and causal logics 
could co-occur in the same decision event. We counted how many effectuation dimensions 
(potentially ranging from 0 to 4) and how many causation dimensions (potentially ranging from 
0 to 4) were coded per decision event. In practice, at least one effectuation or causation 
dimension was coded for each event, and a number of events were coded both for effectuation 
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and causation dimensions. An example of an event coded as both effectuation and as causation is 
SunCo’s event 5, which deals with the decision of exploring different technologies for 
developing solar panels using their previously developed glass and coating knowledge. They 
made sure that they selected a technology that differentiated them from competitors. This event 
was coded as effectuation, specifically the means-oriented dimension (based on the empirical 
indicator ‘Building on own knowledge base and other available existing own resources’, see 
Table 3). The event was also coded for the competitive analysis dimension of causation (based 
on the empirical indicator ‘Carrying out competitor analysis and competitive positioning’).  
 The number of dimensions coded varied substantially over events, with an average number 
of 0.79 effectuation dimensions and 0.89 causation dimensions being coded per event. Pearson 
correlations across events indicated only one significant correlation among the four dimensions 
of effectuation2; the dimensions of causation were not significantly correlated with each other.  
Analysis strategy 
Our research design enabled us to investigate both within-case variation over time and cross-case 
variation (Gerring, 2007). With regard to within-case analyses, the event sequences and their 
coding were analyzed in-depth using qualitative and quantitative process research procedures 
(Poole et al., 2000) including event sequence graphs and tabular representations. This helped to 
explore patterns in the use of effectual and/or causal logics over time, and to gain get insight into 
potential conditions driving changes and shifts in the use of these logics. Process research is 
particularly well suited for identifying such necessary conditions for change (Mohr, 1982). We 
explain methods of analysis in more detail together with the results.   
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The means-oriented basis for taking action was positively correlated with the attitude towards outsiders based on 
partnerships. 	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Exploration of cross-case and within-case variation 
We first explore cross-case variation in the use of effectuation and causation. Table 4 shows that 
all cases used both effectual and causal decision-making logics, although with varying 
frequency. Past research has focused on initial conditions to explain the usage of effectuation and 
causation logics, thus we compared the cases with regard to important initial conditions that have 
been identified in prior research: level of uncertainty (e.g., Sarasvathy, 2008; Brettel et al., 2012) 
and level of entrepreneurial experience (e.g., Dew et al., 2009; Politis et al. 2012). 
==== Insert Table 4 about here ==== 
Key sources of uncertainty are the novelty of the venture’s technology and the novelty of the 
market (e.g., Sarasvathy, 2001). All cases offered new products and/or services based on new 
technologies, yet they differed with regard to the novelty of the market: three cases addressed an 
existing market and five cases addressed a new market (the ninth case targeted both an existing 
market and a new market). Comparing cases targeting an existing versus a new market showed 
no significant difference in the use of effectuation and causation (Table 4), using a Kruskal-
Wallis test. In both types of cases causation was used more frequently than effectuation (on 
average 1 more causation dimension coded for the cases targeting new markets, and 5.5 more for 
the cases targeting existing markets). Similarly, we found no significant differences (using the 
Kruskal-Wallis test) in the use of effectuation and causation comparing the cases where the 
founders had high, moderate and low levels of entrepreneurial experience (Table 4).   
To investigate within-case variation, we first examined the overall use of effectual and 
causal decision-making over the course of venture creation phases. Figure 1 shows the relative 
frequency of the use of effectuation and causation across all cases; Figure 2 displays the same 
information per case. Overall, entrepreneurs used effectuation most dominantly in the idea phase 
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(see Figure 1). Figure 2 reveals that effectuation is dominant in the idea phase in all cases with 
the exception of SunCo (in which causation dominates)3. Causal decision-making becomes 
increasingly important in the later development phases for all cases, while the use of effectuation 
is decreasing (see Figure 1). 
This initial exploration showed a clear pattern in within-case variation that is rather stable 
across cases, whereas exploring cross-case variation revealed no clear patterns. Within-case 
analysis demonstrated that, overall, effectuation is more dominant in the early phases, whereas 
causation is more dominant in later stages. In contrast, the analysis of cross-case variation 
showed that the initial conditions –i.e., the level of uncertainty and experience– are not 
systematically associated with differences in the overall use of effectuation and causation across 
our cases. This does not imply that these initial conditions have no effect, but it confirms that the 
investigation of within-case variation over time is a particularly promising analytical route to 
advance our understanding of the use of decision-making logics in venture creation. Differences 
between cases may to a greater extent emerge from what occurs during venture creation than 
from initial conditions.  
==== Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here ==== 
Detailed temporal patterns in effectuation and causation 
To further investigate within-case variation, we created event sequence graphs for each case 
(Figure 3). We calculated the moving average of the number of effectuation and causation 
dimensions coded per decision event for each case: for the first 10 decision events, we calculated 
the average of the number of effectuation and causation dimensions up to the decision event (for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 SunCo had two founders with different decision-making styles working on different projects. One founder was 
focusing on experimentally creating new markets for inventive solar systems using existing technology, while the 
other founder-who was dominant at the start-focused on a large, causally-planned technology development project to 
create radically new solar cell systems.	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example, the moving average for causation at decision event 4 consists of the sum of the number 
of causation dimensions for decision events 1, 2, 3, and 4, divided by four). For the later decision 
events, we averaged the codes across the last 10 decision events. For example, if for a venture, 
the coding of decision events 11 to 20 resulted in a total number of 15 effectuation dimensions, 
its moving average for effectuation at decision event 20 is 1.5. These calculations resulted in 
event sequence graphs (Figure 3) showing the moving average of effectuation and causation 
codes (on the Y-axis) over the creation of the venture (events on the X axis). The graphs show 
for each case how the use of effectuation and causation logics evolves over time.  
The event sequence graphs in Figure 3 show ‘bumpy’ patterns with many small and big 
shifts in the relative dominance of effectuation and causation throughout venture creation, 
instead of a monotonic decrease of effectuation and increase of causation. Figure 3 also shows an 
increase in effectuation later in the venture creation process for SunCo, ChipCo, TextCo, 
NeuroCo, WaterCo and TravelCo. Thus, underlying the overall pattern of more effectuation in 
earlier phases shifting to more causation in later phases, the cases show more detailed dynamics: 
the dominant decision-making logic shifts several times per case. We now use a more inductive 
approach to explore what drives these shifts in the use of effectual and causal logics.  
==== Insert Figure 3 about here ==== 
Turning points, scoping decisions and their underlying conditions 
Turning points 
To understand the dynamics in the use of effectual and causal logic within the creation of each 
venture, we first identified the main turning points in the event sequence graphs (Figure 3 and 
also Table 5) and then explored what led to these turns. Turning points are points in the graphs 
where substantial or ‘large’ changes in the direction of the curves take place. This is in line with 
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Lichtenstein et al. (2006, p. 163), who define ‘a change point’ as ‘the moment in a time series 
when the associated variable undergoes a shift in its mean or variance’. We operationalized this 
as the points where the moving average –for effectuation or causation– increases or decreases by 
0.5 or more within five decision events. For example, for SunCo, we see a turning point at 
decision event 12, where an increasing trend in the use of effectuation turned into a decreasing 
trend (decreasing by 0.5 from 1.7 at decision event 12 to 1.2 at decision event 17). We identified 
17 turning points across all cases4.  
For each turning point, we then analyzed how the shift in decision-making logics came 
about. Table 5 contains this detailed analysis for each turning point. We noticed a key 
phenomenon: shifts in decision-making logics emerge after entrepreneurs decided to change the 
scope of the ventures’ activities (Table 5, column ‘scoping decisions’). We define the scope of a 
venture as the set of technologies, product offerings, or markets that the entrepreneurs consider 
or target at a particular moment in time. Most turning points were related to significant decisions 
about the set of technologies, products, and or markets considered: narrowing their scope 
(tightened focus) or widening their scope (expanding options). For example, TextCo’s founders, 
preceding turning point 31, narrowed the venture’s scope by focusing on the domestic market, 
after having set-up a foreign office (see Table 5). As one of the founders of TextCo recalls: 
[The foreign office] didn’t bring us anything. We needed to get focused first. So we 
turned our focus 100% to the Netherlands and Belgium. 
At turning point 39, the entrepreneurial team of TextCo widened its scope by expanding 
technological capabilities for serving new sectors (e.g., television, banks). As one of the founders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We performed several robustness checks for how we identified the turning points by calculating and plotting the 
moving average over 20 and 5 instead of 10 events, and by defining turning points as increases or decreases of 0.3 
and 0.7 instead of 0.5 within 5 events. We also analyzed turning points derived from alternative graphs, representing 
the total number of effectuation codes minus the total number of causation codes per event; and the moving average 
of the total number of effectuation codes over 10 events minus the moving average of total number of causation 
codes over 10 events. All analyses indicated that our results were stable across all robustness checks. 	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indicated, they were missing important technological capabilities at the time.  
There are always some customers who want something specific, which required us to 
push boundaries. For television, it was the peak volume of at one time 30.000 messages 
per minute. Our system was completely unprepared for this. For the banks, we required 
continuous monitoring, all day and night, as it should always work. … It took us a lot of 
time to get it completely up and running.  
==== Insert Table 5 about here ==== 
Scoping decisions 
Scoping emerged as a key influence on the subsequent use of effectual and causal decision-
making in the turning point analyses. Table 5 provides details on each scoping decision and the 
related shift in the use of effectuation and causation (columns ‘Scoping decision’ and ‘Shifts in 
the use of effectuation and causation’). Widening the scope mostly led to an increase in the use of 
effectuation and a decrease in the use of causation. It refers to a decision that involves exploring 
alternative technologies, products or markets. To develop a broader scope, the entrepreneurs 
decide to explore options that can be created with their available means, for instance by 
exploring which alternative application fields or markets can be developed with their current 
technology. This process of widening the scope hence preceded the observed increase of 
effectual logic, while the use of causal logic decreased, as no specific goal is yet pursued in these 
explorations. The ChipCo case illustrates how a decision to widen the scope is associated with an 
increase in effectuation (see also Table 5). After having focused on a specific technology and 
market for almost three years using causation as its dominant logic, ChipCo’s founders (in 
decision event 27) started to explore alternative markets for other applications of their 
technological capabilities (e.g. military, supercomputer, remote sensing, and the oil and gas 
industry) in which they followed the effectual logic of focusing on their means rather the pre-set 
goals. Effectuation even became the dominant logic in the post-startup phase (see Figure 2). One 
of ChipCo’s owners reflected on the moment of broadening their scope from one product to a 
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range of possibilities:  
[...] we really started looking at alternatives. We looked at several possibilities to 
develop other applications.[...] I think, basically we tried all the options we had. We also 
made business cases for the military market and for this and that. I think we eventually 
just really tried all options.  
This event demonstrates how ChipCo’s causal approach disappointed in the end, and was 
replaced by effectual decisions reflecting experimentation with new products and market 
strategies based on existing technology as well as attempts to leverage existing contacts to 
generate new customers and business partners. 
By contrast, narrowing the venture’s scope led to more causation and a decrease in the use 
of effectuation. When narrowing the scope, the entrepreneurs focused on a specific set of 
technologies, products/services, or on a specific market. A decision to focus enabled 
entrepreneurial teams to formulate goals, and subsequent efforts were targeted at selecting and 
attracting the means to reach that goal: attracting people with the required expertise, protecting 
IP, goal directed take-over of companies, developing new services for a new market, 
implementing a new business model or plan, and closing a new partnership. These goal-directed 
activities together with protective IP actions explain the observed increase in causal logic and 
decrease in effectual logic. An example of narrowing scope associated with increased causation 
can be found in the SunCo case. At decision event 12, SunCo’s founders narrowed their scope, 
stopped experimenting and selected one specific technology to develop further. From that 
moment on, the use of effectual logic decreased and causation increased. The main founder of 
the venture took many goal-oriented decisions to protect intellectual capital and to hire external 
personnel that fitted the venture’s reinforced focus on one specific technology. As the other 
founder recounted: 
The main owner [...] said: this is what I will do, this is my project. I am going to invest a 
lot of money because I believe in it [...] For development, someone from outside the 
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company was hired to lead this project [focused on one technology]. Very much has been 
invested in these development activities [...]. Compared to other companies, it is really 
ridiculous..  
Scoping decisions were thus identified as underlying the increase and decrease of 
effectuation and causation at turning points. The explanations were similar for all cases, and 
scoping decisions were found in all cases. Table 5 provides further examples. 
Underlying conditions 
The role of scoping decisions as immediate conditions influencing the use of effectuation and 
causation was surprising. Based on the literature, we would have expected perceived uncertainty 
to be a key condition. Thus, we next investigated in more detail what triggered scoping decisions 
at each of the 17 turning points in our ventures’ creation trajectories. First, the co-authors worked 
in three teams and independently inspected three cases each to compile an initial list of potential 
conditions. Second, the lists of potential conditions were compared and discussed across the nine 
cases, until a set of final conditions was determined. Third, the resulting list of conditions was 
used to analyze all turning points. Issues emerging during this analysis were discussed among all 
researchers until consensus was achieved. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 5, in 
the column ‘main condition’.  
Decisions to change the scope were influenced by developments internal and external to the 
venture. We discerned three types of such developments as necessary conditions to lead to 
changes in venture scope. First, changes in the entrepreneurial teams’ perception of 
environmental uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty about the market) lead to changes in venture 
scoping. Increases in perceived uncertainty lead to decisions to widen the scope, and the 
exploration of alternative options to deal with this increased uncertainty, as illustrated at turning 
point 31 in NeuroCo. One of NeuroCo’s founders testified: 
Sales were not going as expected. It turned out that customers didn’t really need such 
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sophisticated software; they could do with Excel….We decided not to spend the 
remaining capital on perfecting the generic software. Instead, we had to search for 
possible profitable applications. 
Decreases in perceived uncertainty, on the other hand, result in narrowing the scope. For 
example, decreased uncertainty in technological or commercial possibilities enables 
entrepreneurial teams to focus on a specific technology or market. In the case of DataCo, a 
collaboration in the health care sector provided evidence for the commercial potential of 
applications in that sector. As explained by one of DataCo’s founders: 
Through this collaboration we discovered there really were a lot of potential applications 
out there [i.e. out in the medical sector].  
As a result, the founders narrowed the venture’s scope at turning point 4, where they made a first 
rough selection of market segment, of which the health sector was one. 
Second, changes in entrepreneurial teams’ perception of the resource position of the venture 
influenced venture scoping: a meager resource position –either in terms of financial or human 
resources– led to widening the scope5. In the SunCo case, financial problems at turning point 34 
drove the entrepreneurs to explore alternative income streams and new ways of keeping costs 
under control. As one of SunCo’s founders recalled: 
There were days where we had just zero euro on our bank account [...] We said: how can 
we generate more cash, because we won’t get it from the bank. So, we considered what 
we can do at the supply and the demand side..  
Entrepreneurs seemed to believe that by broadly scanning many options simultaneously they 
would find some opportunity that might help them to get out of their misery.  
Third, changes in entrepreneurial teams’ perception of pressures from stakeholders (such as 
investors) led to narrowing the scope of the venture6. Stakeholders were often venture capitalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The only exception is at turning point 31 of TextCo, where a low perceived resource position of the venture leads 
to narrowing the scope. Given the lack of human resources, they decided to focus on their current market from the 
main office instead of dividing their attention over two offices. 	  
6 We observe one exception. For AppleCo stakeholder pressures lead to widening the scope (at turning point 19).  
However, this exception can be explained by the simultaneously low resource position of the venture (our second 
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and angel investors who wanted the ventures to focus on a specific technology and market, and 
thus pushed for the development of a new ‘holy grail’ technology to clearly position the business 
in the market. Given their dependent relationship, the entrepreneurs had to respond to their 
pressures and focus the venture’s scope as requested. As one of NeuroCo’s founders testified, 
concerning turning point 16: 
Although the initial idea had been to develop solutions, the board said that, if we wanted 
to be a software company, we had to focus on developing a product. 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN VENTURE 
CREATION 
We synthesize explanations for the observed dynamic patterns and the shifts in the use of 
decision-making logics over time in an integrated dynamic model of strategic decision-making in 
venture creation processes, displayed in Figure 4. 
==== Insert Figure 4 about here ==== 
The shifts in decision-making logics are driven by strategic scoping decisions that determine 
the set of technologies, products, and markets venture founders consider at a certain moment in 
time. Narrowing the scope generally led to a decrease in effectuation and an increase in 
causation, while widening the venture’s scope had the opposite effect. Scoping decisions, in turn, 
were triggered by perceived changes in external and venture conditions (uncertainty, resource 
position and stakeholder pressure). Scoping decisions are thus part of an integrated explanation 
for dynamics in the use of effectuation and causation in venture creation processes. Our data 
further suggests that the use of effectuation and causation may lead to perceived changes in the 
external and venture conditions (represented by the outer arrow in Figure 4), which in turn 
impact strategic decisions on venture scope and thereby increase or decrease the use of effectual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
condition leading to changes in venture scope), which is associated with widening the scope. 	  
	  29	  
	  
or causal decision-making. To illustrate our integrated dynamic model of strategic decision-
making in venture creation processes, we use the example of AppleCo focusing especially on the 
dynamics marked by three turning points (at decision events 7, 19, and 40). 
Since 1982, the owner of an apple tree nursery and the research director of a university’s 
fruit breeding center had jointly developed several new apple varieties. In 1997, the owner of the 
tree nursery conducted a very successful experiment (turning point 7): for the duration of the 
experiment, produce was delivered daily directly to a large supermarket chain (Delhaize). This 
allowed the owner to deliver high quality products and to address consumers’ wishes as they 
arose (as opposed to the supply-driven, long fruit production chain normally in use). As 
explained by one of the founders: 
Through his [one of the founders] family business he had contacts with Delhaize. They 
agreed to set up an experiment …The results were phenomenal: the total turnover of all 
apples in these Delhaize locations rose by 100%, the turnover for his own apple varieties 
rose by 300%, and the frequency of visits to these shops increased by 60%. So, based on 
these results, he really believed that the consumer wanted new and better varieties, and 
that we would be able to commercialize them. 
This experiment hence reduced the founders’ perceived uncertainty about market reactions, 
clarifying the environment, while also increasing the entrepreneurs’ certainty about their 
capabilities and products. This decreased uncertainty, in turn, fed into the decision to narrow the 
scope towards generating commercial products. The founders started preparing the start-up of an 
independent R&D entity focused on commercializing a selection of 20 apple varieties generated 
over the previous fifteen years of research. From that moment on, the use of effectual logic 
decreased and causation increased, as reflected in decisions on the financing and intellectual 
property rights of the venture. One of AppleCo’s founders recounted: 
We dropped the concept of a research company and decided to become a commercial 
entity. We could not do this with project money anymore. It required serious investments 
and a broader technology and product portfolio. We toured the traditional investment 
circuit, in search for money. … We started up negotiations with Penn State University for 
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the exclusivity license on the use of self-fertilization in apples. 
By 2001, however, the commercial focus and accompanying causal decision-making had still not 
generated any substantial revenues. AppleCo needed a new round of capital investment (turning 
point 19). This low perceived resource position led to a widening of the venture’s scope. In 
particular, the founders abandoned their focus on genetic modification of fruit, as this was not 
well received by potential investors. As one AppleCo founder recalled: 
The fruit auctions, which were considered the most appropriate future investors, 
disapproved of the biotech orientation of AppleCo….The negative public attitude towards 
genetically modified food was not going away. 
In order to alleviate their resource needs and acquire additional funding, the founders rethought 
their business plan and opened up to traditional breeding techniques. This widening of the 
venture’s scope led to a decrease in causation and an increase in effectuation. In particular, the 
founders co-developed the new business idea in collaboration with their new investors, as well as 
with new partners, employees and even a new CEO, which all came from their informal network. 
As one founder recalled: 
We developed the new business plan together with our new CEO. He had a more mixed 
profile, with experience in both genetic and traditional breeding. He was already in our 
network and he was interested in working with us and in developing the idea together. 
Over time, this effectual approach in which multiple options were envisaged –including genetic 
and traditional breeding, focusing on fruit quality as well as disease resistance–, resulted in 
concrete information about consumers’ desires and fruit growers’ interests (at turning point 40). 
There was sufficient interest of fruit growers in AppleCo’s varieties, and it became evident that 
consumers were valuing the quality of fruit above the reduced need for pesticides. In other 
words, the effectual decision-making resulted in reduced perceived environmental uncertainty. 
Consequently, the venture again narrowed its scope in 2005 by abandoning its research into 
disease resistance (which had not resulted in any marketable fruit variety) and focused purely on 
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developing and commercializing varieties with improved fruit quality. One of the founders of 
AppleCo recounted: 
Research on disease resistance of apples diminished, as it gave very slow results and 
often came at the cost of fruit quality. As it turned out that consumers were valuing 
quality above buying a more environmentally friendly apple, and as the launch of the 
three existing high quality varieties was going well, we decided to focus instead on fruit 
quality. 
This renewed focus resulted in the use of more causal logic. The company searched for and 
secured intellectual property rights for its core business and one of the founders was bought-out 
due to disagreements on the venture’s new scope. By 2010 however, it became clear that the 
launched apple varieties were in fact not as successful as initially believed. Although initial 
market reaction had been positive, the company was not meeting its sales and revenue targets. 
The causal decisions hence led again to increases in uncertainty and investor pressures. 
DISCUSSION 
This longitudinal study investigated strategic entrepreneurial decision-making during the venture 
creation process. We focused on recursive relations between strategic decision-making and 
venture creation: strategic decisions shape a venture, and outcomes of such decisions in turn 
influence the external and venture conditions, which in turn affect the use of decision-making 
logics. This enabled us to advance understanding of dynamics of strategic decision-making in the 
process of venture creation. 
We advance theorizing on strategic decision-making under uncertainty in three ways. First, 
we clarify the relationship between causal and effectual decision-making logics as examples of 
planning and flexible decision-making logics respectively. We find that strategic entrepreneurial 
decision-making follows a hybrid logic that uses both effectuation and causation simultaneously, 
while the dominant logic dynamically shifts over time. Second, our findings –synthesized in our 
dynamic model of entrepreneurial decision-making– support and elaborate on the insights of 
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Alvarez and Barney (2005) regarding the context-dependence of entrepreneurial decision-
making for venture creation. In particular, they broaden our understanding of conditions and 
drivers of effectuation and causation beyond initial uncertainty and entrepreneurial experience. 
In addition to perceptions of uncertainty, we also identify resource position and stakeholder 
pressures as conditions influencing effectual and causal logics. Furthermore, we find that these 
conditions do not mechanistically trigger entrepreneurs to use more or less effectuation and 
causation. By contrast, our analyses uncover the important, intermediary role of active 
entrepreneurial decisions on venture scope in response to external and venture conditions 
(perceived environmental uncertainty, resource position and stakeholder pressure). Third, our 
findings more generally demonstrate that unique insights can be derived from process research 
on strategic decision-making under uncertainty (on additional conditions influencing effectuation 
and causation, as well as mediating mechanisms) that are not available from cross-sectional 
research.  
Hybrid decision-making logic 
Our findings contribute to a better conceptual understanding of the relation between planning-
based and flexible decision making logics in general, and the relation between causation and 
effectuation in particular. The findings indicate that entrepreneurial decision-making is most 
commonly following a ‘hybrid’ logic that contains and combines elements of both effectuation 
and causation. Thus, our findings confirm expectations that effectual and causal logics are at 
work simultaneously (Dew et al., 2011), and contrast with studies treating effectuation and 
causation as mutually exclusive, opposing logics (e.g., Brettel et al., 2012; Dew et al., 2009).  
We find that one of the logics may predominate at times, but that this emphasis on 
effectuation or causation is subject to shifts over the course of venture creation. This finding 
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challenges studies that treat decision-making logics as stable tendencies, determined by founding 
conditions such as experience and uncertainty. The overall pattern that emerged from our 
analysis lends support to the expectation that flexible decision-making is more prominent in the 
earlier stages of venture creation, with a transition to more planning-based decision-making over 
time as both the new venture and its market mature (Alvarez and Barney, 2005; Sarasvathy, 
2001). Yet, we also qualify this expectation: Effectual decision-making can re-appear in later 
venture creation phases. Thus, effectuation and causation not only co-occur but also re-occur in 
different patterns over the venture creation process. Our dynamic model offers a novel 
explanation for these dynamics in decision-making logics in the venture creation process.  
Conceptualizing entrepreneurial decision-making as following hybrid logic has important 
implications for the measurement of effectuation and causation. First, effectuation and causation 
should be measured independently using separate scales and coding schemes rather than 
presenting effectuation and causation as polar opposites. Second, our results suggest that both 
effectuation and causation may be best conceptualized as formative constructs at the event level. 
There were only very low to zero correlations amongst the dimensions underlying effectuation 
and causation, respectively. Chandler et al. (2011) similarly found effectuation to be a formative 
measure, but they did not find empirical evidence that this is also the case for causation. The fact 
that our results show that both effectuation and causation dimensions are relatively independent 
is probably a result of our fine-grained process approach of investigating decision-making logics 
within specific events, while Chandler et al. (2011) and others measured overall decision-making 
tendencies of individual entrepreneurs cross-sectionally.  
Conditions influencing shifts in decision-making logic 
Our findings deepen and widen our understanding of conditions stimulating effectuation and 
	  34	  
	  
causation and thereby contribute to theory development on strategic decision-making in venture 
creation processes. As Perry et al. (2012) highlight, the next stage of theory development in 
effectuation research requires researchers to build a better and more fine-grained understanding 
of the origins of effectuation. Our findings extend research to date that either examines static 
conditions influencing strategic decision-making such as entrepreneurial expertise (e.g., Dew et 
al., 2009; Sarasvathy, 2001), which cannot explain shifts in the use of effectual and causal logic 
over time; or otherwise focuses on uncertainty at founding (e.g., Wiltbank et al., 2009; Read et 
al, 2009a). 
We highlight scoping decisions as central to our understanding of shifts between decision-
making logics in venture creation processes. They serve as a way to discover or create 
opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). As such, the concept of scoping in this study is not so 
much related to the concept of ‘economies of scope’ as discussed in the strategic management 
literature (Teece, 1980; Levinthal and Wu, 2010), but more to the concept of ‘search breadth’ as 
a way to discover or create new opportunities (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2013). Neither the 
strategic management literature nor evolutionary theory has systematically linked this concept to 
decision-making logics however. Recent work by Alvarez et al. (2013) and Andries et al. (2013) 
hints at a potential relationship between searching broadly for new opportunities and the use of 
effectual decision-making. We make this relationship explicit by demonstrating that a decision to 
widen venture scope leads to an increase in the use of effectual decision-making, such as flexibly 
leveraging contingencies at hand and creative experimentation. In contrast, narrowing venture 
scope leads to a causal logic of control aimed at greater efficiency. 
We extend this thinking further by presenting evidence on what leads to changes in venture 
scoping, and, as a consequence, in decision-making logics. Our process study supports the 
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theoretical argumentation by Alvarez and Barney (2005) that venture creation processes are 
characterized by changing levels of risk versus uncertainty, and that these changes will require 
entrepreneurs to adjust their decision-making logic. In particular and in line with past theorizing 
and research, our study highlights the importance of perceived uncertainty as a condition 
explaining shifts in the use of effectual and causal logic over time. However, we also uncover 
novel, time-varying conditions influencing shifts in decision-making logics including perceptions 
of resource position and stakeholder pressure. Taking account of these conditions (changes in 
perceived uncertainty, resource position and stakeholder pressure) enables us to explain why we 
do not see a simple uniform development from effectuation to causation over time. Changes in 
these conditions, can interrupt and ‘re-set’ the suitability of decision-making logics through their 
impact on active venture scoping decisions. Thus, adopting a process approach helped to build a 
more fine-grained understanding of influence mechanisms and a greater appreciation of the role 
of entrepreneurs’ agency in venture creation (see McMullen and Dimov, 2013). 
Changes in venture resource position lead to changes in scope and indirectly to shifts in 
effectuation or causation. When resources are insufficient to continue with a venture creation 
path, entrepreneurs predominantly widen their venture’s scope, which subsequently leads to an 
increase in effectual decision-making. This result extends earlier findings that resource 
constraints stimulate resourcefulness and lead to a search for creative solutions by using flexible 
decision-making logics (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Carter and Van Auken, 2005; Mosakowski, 
2002). Interestingly, these findings are at odds with the more general observation of rigidity and 
narrowing of focus and scope observed when larger organizations face resource constraints (cf. 
Staw et al., 1981; Kaul, 2012), suggesting that firm size may moderate the impact of resource 
positions. 
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We find that stakeholders such as investors often push for narrower rather than broader 
venture scope. Several explanations can be hypothesized: Our findings may illustrate that many 
investors are still convinced about the validity of a focused approach. They may regard a broad 
scope of activities as an indication of the entrepreneurs’ inability to ‘do their homework.’ 
Similarly, investors may not be supportive of changes in venture scope, questioning whether the 
initial technology, product or market choice was wrong or whether the problems reflect 
inadequate execution by the venture’s founders (cf. Bhide, 1992). Investors likely prefer a broad 
scope of activities at the level of their investment portfolio, rather than within each individual 
company. If at all, investors seem to accept widening the scope only as a last resort, a ‘fire-
fighting’ or ‘emergency’ strategy to protect their endangered investments in individual ventures. 
Our findings on scoping also advance the understanding of conditions for and consequences 
of scoping in the strategic management literature. This literature provides some basic insights in 
this respect, i.e. changes in corporate scope result from resource constraints, the firms’ 
technological innovations or innovations introduced by competitors (Kaul, 2012; Levinthal and 
Wu, 2010). It also connects changes in scope and search breadth with performance outcomes, 
and advocates that larger search breadth increases innovation performance (Klingebiel and 
Rammer, 2013). We add to this emerging literature in two ways. First, our findings highlight 
stakeholder pressure as an additional condition influencing scoping decisions. Second, our 
findings suggest an important pathway –shifts in strategic decision-making logics– through 
which scoping may ultimately impact firm performance. Thus, our findings may aid the building 
of more differentiated theoretical models on the consequences of scoping.  
Practical implications 
We show how a planning-based and a flexible decision-making logic are combined in real-life. 
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Because entrepreneurs commonly use a hybrid decision-making logic, the ability to shift 
between the two logics emerges as a key entrepreneurial capability. Our dynamic model of 
strategic decision-making in new venture creation processes can be used to stimulate 
practitioners to reflect about the conditions shaping venture scope, including the consequences of 
venture scope for using certain decision-making logics. Entrepreneurs may benefit from 
considering the fit of effectuation with a wider venture scope and causation with a narrower 
scope.  
Taken together, our findings imply that entrepreneurship education should train and support 
both effectual and causal decision-making: enabling entrepreneurs both to plan and to adapt; to 
work towards goals and to exploit means; to compete and to collaborate; to calculate expected 
returns and to limit downside loss. It should also develop entrepreneurs’ skills to judge when to 
use either approach, as well as their ability to combine both types of reasoning.  
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
A limitation of the current study is its reliance on retrospective data, which could impact the 
accuracy and completeness of data, in particular on earlier phases of the case histories. We took 
measures to limit retrospective bias, such as using both documents and interviews, focusing on 
significant decision events (Chell, 2004), utilizing event lists (Belli, 1998), and ensuring that 
decision events were mentioned by the founders and at least one other data source. In general, 
where retrospection affects data, it typically leads to more sanitized, rationalized versions of 
history (Schwenk, 1985), associated in particular with elements of causal decision-making. Thus, 
we do not expect our key findings (effectual decision-making in the earlier stages and multiple 
shifts in logics) to be explained as an effect of retrospection. Nevertheless, future research would 
benefit from documenting dynamics in real time.  
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Whilst we found evidence for the hybrid use of effectual and causal decision-making logics, 
future research could clarify whether there may be certain decision areas that lend themselves 
particularly well to either effectual or causal decision-making. Although we focused on 
technology ventures, as these are confronted with substantial uncertainty regarding technologies 
and markets, future studies should verify whether the same decision-making dynamics are 
present in ventures that are confronted with other types of uncertainty beyond technology. 
Furthermore, large corporations are increasingly confronted with uncertainty, e.g., arising from 
new competitors in new markets or the increasing speed of development. Thus, future research 
may test our dynamic model of strategic decision-making in a corporate context.  
We also see opportunities for research exploring whether additional conditions - next to 
changes in perceived environmental uncertainty, venture resource position, and stakeholder 
pressure - lead to changes in venture scope, thereby complementing our model. Also, it needs to 
be noted that whereas the strength of process research is to identify necessary conditions, 
variance research is needed to determine whether the necessary conditions that we identified are 
also sufficient conditions for change in the use of decision-making logics (Mohr, 1982). 
To advance theory on decision-making processes in new venture creation processes under 
uncertainty, future research could also explore the consequences of hybrid decision-making 
logics and adaptive processes of venture scoping on venture type. Given that the use of these 
decision-making logics depends on the presence of uncertainty about the value of opportunities 
and residual rights, we might expect that these types of decision-making logics may also be 
associated with different types of entrepreneurial firms (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). We also 
hope to inspire future research that links shifts in the use of effectual and causal logics and their 
combination, to the speed and efficiency of venture creation processes, venture growth, survival 
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and profitability. 
Finally, this study focused on effectual and causal decision-making logics as examples of 
planning and flexible decision-making approaches more generally. We suggest that the hybrid 
decision-making pattern uncovered in our study may well generalize to the interplay of planning 
and flexible decision-making approaches more generally, which often are similarly treated as 
mutually exclusive. Further research covering a broader range of decision-making approaches is 
therefore warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, we extend research on decision-making under uncertainty as an important element in the 
organizing process of entrepreneurial firms (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). By studying patterns in 
ventures’ effectual and causal decision-making in-depth and over time, we find that 
entrepreneurs typically employ hybrid decision-making logics, and shift from one dominant 
decision-making logic to the other. We explain these shifts, highlighting the intermediary role of 
‘venture scoping’. An entrepreneur’s narrow focus on a ‘holy grail’ leads to causal decision-
making, while a broad scope pursuing several options simultaneously leads to effectual decision-
making. We also enrich the understanding of conditions influencing the use of decision-making 
logics, identifying venture resource position, and stakeholder pressure in addition to uncertainty 
as drivers of venture scoping. 
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FIGURE 1. Percentage of effectuation and causation dimensions coded over all cases  
and per venture creation phase 
 
FIGURE2. Distribution of effectuation and causation dimensions coded per case  
and per venture creation phase 
 
Note: “0” means that the amount of effectual decisions equals the amount of causal 
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FIGURE 4. A dynamic model of strategic decision-making in venture creation processes 
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TABLE 1. Case characteristics 
 
Case Industry Existing or 
new product 
and market7 
Entrepreneurial 
experience of 
founders8 
Period 
covered 
Events Inter-
views 
Archival 
documents 
SunCo Solar NEW product, 
EXISTING 
market 
HIGH: Two founders 
with venture experience 
1997–
2010 
50 9 63 
ChipCo Telecom NEW product, 
EXISTING 
market 
MODERATE: One 
founder with industry 
and managerial 
experience, three 
inexperienced founders.  
2000–
2003 
36 9 54 
TextCo Telecom New product, 
NEW market 
LOW: Two founders 
with almost no 
experience (fresh 
graduates) 
1999–
2010 
49 10 32 
DataCo Information 
Technology 
New product, 
NEW market 
LOW: Two PhD 
students with only 
experience in university-
industry projects 
1998–
2004 
45 5 130 
NeuroCo Information 
Technology 
New product, 
EXISTING 
market 
MODERATE: Three 
founders with no 
entrepreneurial 
experience (professor, 
PhD students); one with 
consulting experience 
1997–
2002 
38 8 5 
AppleCo Agriculture New product, 
EXISTING 
market and 
new product, 
NEW market 
HIGH: One founder 
with industry, venture, 
and managerial 
experience; one without 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
1982–
2010 
45 4 130 
EnergyCo Green 
Energy 
New product, 
NEW market 
LOW: Three PhDs; one 
with industry experience 
1996–
2010 
48 6 
 
55 
WaterCo Green 
energy 
New product, 
EXISTING 
market 
LOW: Two students 
with almost no 
experience (fresh 
graduates) 
1999–
2010 
42 3 
 
10 
TravelCo Information 
Technology 
New product, 
NEW market 
MODERATE: Two PhD 
students (one with some 
managerial experience, 
another with some 
venture experience)  
2005–
2010 
32 2 
 
15 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A market is classified as ‘new’ if the type of product/service that the firm offers has not been previously available 
in that market or because the type of product/service enters a new geography or new market segment (based on 
Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005).  
8 The rating of the founders’ entrepreneurial experience is based on the assessment of the degree of prior venture, 
managerial, and industry experience as ‘high’, ‘moderate’, and ‘low’. The final rating per case is determined by 
classifying founders with high prior venture experience as high, and founders with moderate or high managerial and 
industry experiences as moderate. 
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TABLE 2. Short case descriptions	  
 
SunCo: In early 2000, the founders of a small energy company and of a multinational glass company combine forces to start a 
company in the solar panel industry. They adopt a dual strategy, funded by their private capital. One founder sets out to build a 
project based business using standard available products, while the other commits to large upfront investments in a radically new 
solar technology. The project based business grows steadily over time and expands internationally. Meanwhile, the technology 
development process is behind schedule and going over budget. As the economic crisis hits in 2008, the company experiences 
liquidity problems. The company devises alternative strategies.	  
	  
ChipCo: After being approached by a VC firm in 2000, a professor and PhD student start, with the help of an outside CEO with 
extensive telecom experience, a company based on their optical chip technology. During the product development phase of their 
first product, the telecom industry crashes. Confident in their capabilities, the team continues. Potential clients fail however to 
purchase the product as it demands as total redesign of their systems. In need of cash, the team quickly develops a second more 
marketable product and starts looking for additional funding and for other applications and markets for their technology. With no 
other options left, the company is taken over. 
	  
TextCo: During their industrial engineering program in 1999, two students decide to try sending text messages (SMS) as an 
advertising tool for the local nightclub. They collect numbers of people entering nightclubs and use their university laptops and 
their parent’s internet connection to send the messages. When proven successful, the students start their company and soon offer 
SMS services to other types of businesses like logistics firms. The founders try to introduce new products in the new market 
created by the availability of SMS-technology and even open a new office abroad to reach new customers there. 
	  
DataCo: In 1999, three doctoral students decide to commercialize their research on neural network technology in a new spin-off. 
DataCo initially serves three previously non-existing market segments with customized software. In 2001, two markets are 
dropped and DataCo decides to offer high-end state-of the art customer intelligence solutions to amongst others 
financial/insurance companies. The chosen focus soon proves fruitful as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 leads to stricter regulation 
forcing financial institutions to take security measures. In 2002, DataCo starts to internationalize and merges in 2004 with an 
established international firm to support its international expansion. 
	  
NeuroCo: In 2000, NeuroCo is founded as a spin-off, with the aim of developing and commercializing software solutions using a 
neural network based algorithm developed at the university. The first year is spent on developing software and executing IT 
consulting projects to generate some income. Early 2001, all efforts are directed to commercializing the software product and 
consulting activities are abandoned. NeuroCo has huge problems in obtaining market credibility. It turns out to be impossible to 
compete with big players. In July 2002, NeuroCo decides to end the NeuroCo story: the patents and algorithms are sold to a 
software provider, and NeuroCo ceases to exist. 
	  
AppleCo: Since 1982, the owner of an apple tree nursery and the research director of a university’s fruit breeding center had 
jointly developed several new apple varieties. In 2000, they found AppleCo with the goal of licensing new varieties through 
traditional methods as well as molecular breeding methods, thereby targeting an emerging market segment. Molecular breeding is 
reduced in 2001 and abandoned in 2004. AppleCo’s business model is innovative involving a ‘club’ with members from each step 
in the industry’s value chain. It allows AppleCo to successfully commercialize three new apple varieties in a shrinking industry. 
	  
EnergyCo: Founded in 1996 by two students, EnergyCo was considered a successful company operating in the renewable energy 
industry. Due to regulatory changes, for example reductions in the feed-in tariffs for the European renewable energy market, and 
also as a consequence of its fast growth, EnergyCo is facing a variety of challenges by 2010. The two founders are moving in the 
direction of power producers. A supply side new market emerges:	   creating joint-ventures between EnergyCo and local energy 
suppliers creates individual distribution channels for B2B and B2C business. 
	  
WaterCo: In 1999, three technical engineers invented a new product to the existing market of clean sewage water. They filed for 
patent for their inventions, founded their company WaterCo, and in 2000 received financial support from different start-up support 
programs and later acquired venture capital. In December 2003, the company received its first major order. In January 2004, a 
lawsuit alleging multiple infringements of intellectual property rights threatened the company’s very existence. WaterCo ended up 
being bought up by another large competitor. 
	  
TravelCo: In 2007, TravelCo started out as a university spin-off to replace inefficient and time-consuming search-and-compare 
processes for passenger transport with new technology on the internet. It enables people to perform comprehensive searches 
including all relevant transport modes. The internet platform and the founding team demonstrated successfully that their concept 
worked in their home market in 2009. However, by August 2010, TravelCo faced the threat of competition from new market 
entries backed by big internet players. TravelCo’s founders were forced to consider expanding internationally. 
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TABLE 3. Coding structure and exemplary decision events 
 
Empirical indicators Exemplary decision events 
Effectuation / Basis for taking action: means oriented 
• Building on own knowledge base 
and other available existing own 
resources (including employees 
and material resources).  
SunCo founder uses the German factory to brand SunCo as a well-reputed German 
company (made in Germany), while actually being Dutch, and to generate international 
exposure. (SunCo, 2003) 
• Defining only rough visions while 
leaving the details open. 
An eventual founder of SunCo sees his existing energy panel business threatened and 
imagines opportunities in solar energy. He explores different means and mini-projects to 
use solar and other 'green' sources, such as wind, solar-thermal and PV. (SunCo, 1997) 
• Using infrastructure of local 
environment and technological 
know-how available in 
environment. 
Founders of TextCo start with SMS services. To approach people, they collected phone 
numbers by going to nightclubs and talking to the customers. Subsequently, they sent 
text messages with a weekly agenda of the nightclub, the number of visitors increased 
and they convinced the nightclub owners to pay for their service. (TextCo, 1999) 
• Following personal preferences. Founders of TravelCo experience that the internet becomes the preferred medium for 
people searching for passenger transport options, but the search for connectivity using 
multiple modes of transport is cumbersome and time-intensive. When the founders meet, 
they soon decided to develop a business around this comparison. (TravelCo, 2007) 
• Building on existing network of 
contacts to identify/create 
opportunities (includes attracting 
employees). 
WaterCo’s founders decide to engage an existing contact to work full-time at WaterCo. 
This engineer, after working in big chemical company, is also holding a patent in the 
field, which strengthens WaterCo’s position in relation to a VC which shows interest. 
(WaterCo, 2001) 
Effectuation / Attitude towards unexpected events: leverage 
• Accepting, gathering and 
incorporating unexpected 
feedback, leading to changing 
paths of development. 
AppleCo launches a new apple type, but based on fruit breeders’ complaints about the 
earlier concept the concept is adapted: anyone can buy trees to breed the apples on 
continental Europe, but in the UK, New Zealand and Australia, the club concept is 
upheld. (AppleCo, 2005) 
• Changing and adapting any 
potential plans made to 
accommodate unforeseen events. 
WaterCo ends up in a lawsuit with a huge competitor and the founders decide to search 
for potential partners who want to commit themselves to this new situation and to start 
talking with the government about protection options. (WaterCo, 2004) 
• Actively exposing to outside 
influences, while being open 
minded. 
The founders of TextCo realize that they have missed out on the premium SMS market 
(e.g. TV shows). By coincident, they run into a competitor in a hotel lobby and ask him 
to use TextCo technology to send premium SMS. (TextCo, 2006) 
• Positively reacting to and 
incorporating unforeseen 
developments. 
DataCo founders change focus based on changed circumstances: focus on fraud 
detection and money laundering based on perceived commercial opportunities in these 
sectors and earlier successful projects –this is also in response to 9/11 and 
accompanying legal changes. (DataCo, 2001) 
Effectuation / Attitude towards outsiders: partnerships 
• Reaching trust-based flexible 
stakeholder agreements and 
commitments. 
Following experiences in Germany, Belgium, SunCo removes the wholesalers from the 
sales and distribution channel, and engage directly in market creation with fitters (which 
receive information, training and promotional material and flexible contracts), which 
also gives them more options to maintain control in the fast-changing market. (SunCo, 
2008) 
• Co-create business with 
stakeholders. 
EnergyCo’s founders decide to team up with local energy providers as joint venture 
partners to make local solar projects possible, as they needed the local funding 
possibilities of these partners. (EnergyCo, 1999) 
• Engaging in stakeholder 
collaborations to pursue 
opportunities (while commitment 
AppleCo’s founders decide to cooperate in a large European project for disease 
resistance and the development of ‘pre-breeding’ genetic material for disease resistant 
races. Cooperation is established through contacts on congresses within the fruit sector. 
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Empirical indicators Exemplary decision events 
extends beyond what they have 
agreed on earlier). 
(AppleCo, 2010) 
• Exposing (draft) products to 
potential clients early on. 
Founder of ChipCo starts talking to potential customers with only a draft of the product. 
He contacts Lucent, Nortel, and Cisco to find out how ChipCo’s radical new product 
could be of value for them. They all want to see the real product first. (ChipCo, 2001) 
Effectuation / View of risk and resources: affordable loss 
• Be willing to make affordable 
personal sacrifices (including non-
monetary) for the best of the 
venture. 
The first phase of the company’s life is financed by the founders, who also personally 
benefit from the state-run support program EXIST, offered in Germany to university, 
technology-based start-ups. (TravelCo, 2009) 
• Finding unused resources in local 
environment (including subsidies). 
Although ChipCo’s VC initially discouraged searching for subsidies (if you need more 
money, ask us), he now stimulates it as a way to acquire ‘cheap money’ because of the 
economical downturn. Founders decide to apply for a Dutch Government grant of 2 mio 
EUR for cooperation with a university. (ChipCo, 2001)  
• Investing limited, small amounts 
of personal/company money, time 
and effort. 
The founders of SunCo start to search for different (small) projects to apply solar panels. 
They view these projects as experiments to ‘test the waters’ in this volatile market. 
(SunCo, 2000) 
• Managing growth expectations 
and ambitions. 
Because the technology development is very problematic, and the economic situation is 
unfavorable and uncertain, SunCo announces officially that it postpones the planned and 
announced large factory for thin film with at least 1,5 years. (SunCo, 2009) 
• Limiting stakeholders' 
commitments to levels that are 
uncritical to them. 
Being approached by multiple investors, TextCo’s founders decide not to attract external 
investments to finance a potential take-over of a competitor, as they do not want to 
become dependent upon investors and to maintain control. (TextCo, 2007) 
Causation / Basis for taking action: goal oriented 
• Base actions upon expectations 
(market, technology, policy 
trends) and predictions (of 
founders, board members, 
investors). 
TravelCo’s founders do a detailed investigation of the German travel market, which 
revealed strong growth opportunities. Based upon this analysis, the founders decide to 
focus on the business-to-consumer (B2C) market. Of this, the most relevant target 
market is the Visiting Friends or Relatives (VFR) segment. (TravelCo, 2009) 
• Defining and pursuing project 
goals, product, customer needs or 
market goals (more specific than 
‘profit’, ‘a better planet’). 
For each project, EnergyCo starts to prepare tailored and extensive financing plans in 
order to raise funding. (EnergyCo 1999) 
• Defining and satisfying 
organizational needs (personnel, 
organization structure, 
infrastructure, technology, etc.) 
and selecting between options 
based on specific goals. 
EnergyCo is aware of the need for a more sophisticated business development processes. 
The company’s growth is suffering from a lack of systems with a negative impact on the 
speed of realizing projects. To try and correct this, one of the founders starts to work on 
the improvement of the information flow within EnergyCo and decides after an analysis 
to implement an ERP system (for the second time). The goal of the ERP is to coordinate 
and optimize the usage of internal and external firm resources. (EnergyCo 2009) 
• Evaluating planned progress and 
adapting means based upon 
feedback. 
To sustain projected growth, DataCo’s founders decide that they had to increase 
capacity including the number of employees, To achieve this, a capital increase or 
industrial partner is considered. (DataCo, 2004) 
• Searching and selecting contacts, 
clients and partners based upon 
predefined plans. 
Based upon months of planning and preparing, TextCo organizes a large (and 
expensive) mobile congress to attract media attention and potential new customers. 
(TextCo, 2009)  
Causation / Attitude towards unexpected events: avoid 
• Carefully interacting with 
environment for secrecy reasons 
(feel threatened by unexpected 
events, therefore work in isolation 
ChipCo’s supply chain is organized in such a way that nobody except ChipCo knows the 
details of the production process: supplier of semiconductor material in Japan, the 
foundry in the US, further processing in the UK, part of it to the Netherlands for testing, 
others to the US and finally to Thailand for packaging. (ChipCo, 2001) 
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Empirical indicators Exemplary decision events 
as much as possible). 
• Carrying out plans as defined in 
cases of unforeseen developments. 
As test results are disappointing, ChipCo’s founders decide to double the test runs (of 
100k EUR each) to keep on track with product development and increase yield of 
process. (ChipCo, 2002) 
• In cases of unforeseen 
developments, focusing on 
activities within the firm rather 
than engaging in interactions with 
the environment.  
After a few failed prototypes, the product development team of NeuroCo focuses on 
developing their own ideas of the best product, without interacting with the potential 
client. The software turned out not to offer an extra value (because the NeuroCo 
software is high-dimensional; for the medical application only 10 dimensions or so were 
needed). (NeuroCo, 2000) 
• Drawing back from project or 
quickly resolving in cases of 
unforeseen developments. 
Buyout of one of the founders of AppleCo due to disagreements between the 
shareholders. No cooperation with his tree nursery any more from this point on. 
(AppleCo, 2008) 
Causation / Attitude towards outsiders: competitive analysis 
• Acquiring resources through 
market transactions or contract-
based agreements with 
stakeholders. 
The main providers in the German market are covered by a partnership agreement. 
(TravelCo, 2008) 
• Creating and carrying out patent 
strategy. 
To protect WaterCo’s technology, the founders file their first patent. (WaterCo, 2000) 
• Carrying out competitor analysis 
and competitive positioning. 
Founders of DataCo focus on writing a second business plan. Writing of the plan was 
done both to attract new investors as well as to make a mapping of where Data4s was 
heading, how we can best organize our organization to be better aligned with new 
market segment, and to strategically position the company compared to competitors. 
(DataCo, 2001) 
• Carrying out systematic market 
research activities. 
TravelCo’s founders to an extensive market analysis and find out that by 2009 the 
European online booking market is worth about 60 billion Euros of which 39 billion is 
spent on passenger traffic. Of this, about 2 billion Euros represent commission-based 
sales. They select this as the target market for fromatob.com. (TravelCo, 2009) 
Causation / View of risk and resources: expected returns 
• Maximizing personal profit. Although there is no clear business plan yet, the founders of ChipCo start and get paid 
by the VC-investments. They have high salaries to compensate for the risks they take. 
(ChipCo, 2001)  
• Calculating and evaluating 
expected outcomes/returns. 
Reorientation of NeuroCo apparently is too late; to avoid bankruptcy, either a merger or 
liquidation are considered. Decision is made based on the question: how high are the 
losses? They decide not to go immediately for bankruptcy, but to use the remaining 
capital to pay employees and leave everything in good order, in order to do so they had 
to call all the capital. (NeuroCo, 2002) 
• Planning development in big steps 
and with large sums (including 
large recruitments)(large: relative 
for company). 
To secure investment of 3 mio EUR, the founders put 150k EUR in patents and money 
into the company to bring the investor on board, to be able to make the planned large 
step with the company. (WaterCo, 2002) 
• Postponing stakeholder (including 
clients) contact at the expense of 
own funds (focus on internal 
development). 
NeuroCo’s founders focus on internal development of their own software using the 
collected funding, rather than engaging with customer who could pay for it. (NeuroCo, 
2000) 
• Search for stakeholders that 
commit the amounts necessary for 
the execution of the plan. 
Founders of DataCo actively search for new large amounts of capital from funds and/or 
investors by engaging in a roadshow, presentations, etc. (DataCo, 2001) 
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TABLE 4. Analysis of cross-case variation 
 
Case Market Experience Number of 
effectuation 
dimensions 
coded 
Number of 
causation 
dimensions 
coded 
Difference # 
effectuation and 
# causation 
dimensions 
coded 
      
SunCo Existing High 57 40 17 
ChipCo Existing Moderate 36 41 -5 
TextCo New Low 37 34 3 
DataCo New Low 43 36 7 
NeuroCo Existing Moderate 24 43 -19 
AppleCo Both High 26 37 -11 
EnergyCo New Low 38 44 -6 
WaterCo Existing Low 20 35 -15 
TravelCo New Moderate 23 31 -8 
       
Averages New   35.3 36.3   -1.0 
 Existing  34.3 39.8  -5.5 
           
  High 41.5 38.5 3.0 
  Moderate 27.7 38.3 -10.6 
  Low 34.5 37.3 -2.8 
 
 
TABLE 5. Analysis of turning points 
 
Case Turning 
point 
Main condition (development 
preceding turning point) 
Scoping decision Shifts in the use of effectuation and 
causation  
SunCo 12 Low perceived environmental 
uncertainty: By exploring 
information about possible 
technologies, the founders 
decreased uncertainty on 
technological possibilities. ‘And 
then you start to delve into the 
technologies ... and see all these 
technologies passing by and then 
you evaluate them.’ 
Narrowing scope: Focus on one 
technology.  
The main owner thought 
visionary: this can become 
something. He said: this is what I 
will do, this is my project. I am 
going to invest a lot of money 
because I believe in it.’ 
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
increases. Goal-directed decisions to 
attract people, protect IP, etc. 
‘For [new technology] development, 
someone from outside the company 
was hired to lead this project. … Very 
much has been invested in 
development activities, really 
ridiculous. … But for the [main] 
owner, that was just worth it.’ 
 34 Low perceived resource position 
of the venture: Cash flow 
problems due to economic crises 
and subsequent drop in market 
demand. ‘There were days [in 
2008] where we had just zero 
euro on our bank account.’ 
Widening scope: Decision to 
explore alternative income and 
decreased costs.  
‘We said: how can we generate 
more cash, because we won’t get 
it from the bank. So, we 
considered what we can do at the 
supply and the demand side. … 
We looked at how we can 
decrease our operational costs.’ 
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. Exploration of creative and 
flexible solutions, such as postponing 
payments, asking prepayments, 
breaking up existing contracts, setting 
up a joint venture, etc.  
‘I looked at the most important 
suppliers. We instantly started 
(re)negotiations. We also opened up 
some long-term contracts. ‘ 
ChipCo 3 High perceived stakeholder 
pressures: VC wants focus on 
specific technology and market 
(holy grail). ‘The technology is 
Narrowing scope: Decision to 
start ChipCo, focus on specific 
technology.  
‘They started to further develop 
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
increases. Attracting more money, 
arranging IP, attracting experienced 
people.  
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about monolithic integration of 
optical components. This is 
regarded as the holy grail. [The 
VC investor] said: ‘we are 
willing to invest 2 mio euro in 
your private company and you 
should just start with it.’ ‘  
the technology. We had a plan to 
use the 2 mio euro to construct 
the basis of the venture and to 
have another financing round 
within nine months to proceed 
with the development.’ 
‘We made a plan and [prepared an] 
investor pitch, we visited 25 to 30 
parties to see who was interested and 
then tried to come to a deal.’  
 27 Low perceived resource position 
of the venture: The venture ran 
out of money and was not able to 
attract more. ‘Meanwhile we 
burned all our money and we 
needed a new financing round. 
At the same time, the market 
collapsed. ... The investors 
answered similarly: what you do 
is very exciting, but not now.’ 
Widening scope: Decision to 
explore alternative markets. 
‘Certainly, when the telecom 
market collapsed and our 
customers said ‘not now’, we 
really started looking at 
alternatives. We looked at 
several possibilities to develop 
other applications.’ 
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. Development of prototypes 
for other markets as a reaction to 
unsuccessful previous focus.  
‘I think, basically we tried all the 
options we had. We also made 
business cases for the military market 
and for this and that. I think we 
eventually just really tried all options. 
‘. 
TextCo 31  Low perceived resource position 
of the venture: Incapability of the 
founders to manage the foreign 
office well from the Netherlands, 
and bad market conditions.  
‘But you cannot really have a 
business in another country 
without your full-time presence 
there. This is actually what I 
learned.’ 
Narrowing scope: Decision to 
close TextCo’s foreign office and 
to focus on the domestic market.  
‘[The foreign office] didn’t bring 
us anything. We needed to get 
focused first. So we turned our 
focus 100% to the Netherlands 
and Belgium.’ 
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
increases. Focus on the Dutch market, 
by taking over other companies and 
developing services for another 
market (banking). ‘I think around 
2007, there were so many acquisitions. 
And then we participated: we went to 
competing companies that were 
willing to stop or which got other 
priorities and we asked: ‘Can we take 
over these activities.’ We did that 
actually successfully twice. ‘ 
 39 Low perceived resource position 
of the venture: To attract the rest 
of the local market, they missed 
technological resources in terms 
of capabilities. ‘There are always 
some customers who want 
something specific, which 
required us to push boundaries. 
For television, it was the peak 
volume of at one time 30.000 
messages per minute. Our system 
was completely unprepared for 
this. For the banks, we required 
continuous monitoring.’  
Widening scope: Decision to 
expand technological capabilities 
for other sectors (producers for 
television, banks, police) (invest 
in hardware and software). 
‘There were some clients who 
kept us sharp. … They came 
from competitors. We took them 
over, which was quite exciting, 
because they send almost every 
second during a day five text 
messages. .. It took us a lot of 
time to get it completely up and 
running.’  
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. Explore a new business 
model, new products and services and 
international markets.  
‘We make money with technology. … 
Our technology unit is now much 
more involved in revenue share. We 
now develop technology for a 
customer in a certain country and do 
this for free, but we want 10% of the 
margin. We succeeded several times 
to make a lot of money with this 
model. … But these were big steps to 
take.’ 
DataCo 4 Low perceived environmental 
uncertainty: Collaboration in 
health sector resulted in 
recognition of commercial 
potential of developed 
technology. ‘Through this 
collaboration we discovered 
there really were a lot of 
potential applications out there.’ 
Narrowing scope: Targeted 
attempts to set up commercial 
business. First rough selection of 
market segments, including 
health. ‘Professor X convinced 
us of important opportunities for 
application of our techniques in 
medicine. We brought together a 
consortium of doctors and started 
looking for research funds to 
develop this further.’  
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
increases. Subsequent developments 
display increased goal-directed 
decisions, such as attempts to 
transform contract research in 
commercial business and to license the 
software. ‘We basically took a phone 
book and started calling up all 
potential customers.’ ‘We develop 
clear agreements on IPR with the 
university’. 
 19 Low perceived resource position 
of the venture: DataCo has 
Widening scope: Look broadly to 
acquire the required human 
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
decreases. Mobilizing informal 
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difficulties in attracting staff 
members with required expertise. 
It simultaneously realizes that it 
is active in too many different 
markets, stretching resources 
even further.  ‘We just didn’t 
succeed in attracting the right 
people.’  
resources.  ‘We had to find other 
ways to recruit.’ 
 
Narrowing scope: Focus on less 
market segments.  
‘We discontinued the sports 
activities.’ 
 
networks to find competent employees 
and to find customers. Dropping 
sports market applications, rewriting 
business plan, and start of lengthy 
internal reorganization. ‘We started to 
introduce more structure and to clarify 
the personnel members’ 
responsibilities.’ 
Neuro-
Co 
16 High perceived stakeholder 
pressures: Pushed to develop the 
‘holy grail’ and generate high 
income based on founders 
promise in this regard. ‘Although 
the initial idea had been to 
develop solutions, the board said 
that, if we wanted to be a 
software company, we had to 
focus on developing a product.’ 
Narrowing scope: More focus on 
development of software product 
than consulting.  
‘We reduced our engagement in 
consulting projects, and focused 
purely on developing and 
commercializing the software 
product.’ 
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
decreases. Work on the software 
development, combined with 
continued consulting projects (not 
related to their technology) as these 
were the only projects that generated 
income.  
 
 
 31 High perceived environmental 
uncertainty: Uncertainty due to 
lack of sales and project success. 
‘Sales were not going as 
expected. It turned out that 
customers didn’t really need such 
sophisticated software; they 
could do with Excel’. 
Widening scope: Trying to sell 
customized solutions instead of 
developing generic product.  
‘We decided not to spend the 
remaining capital on perfecting 
the generic software. Instead, we 
had to search for possible 
profitable applications.’ 
 
 
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. As a reaction to this lack of 
sales, more focus on clients’ needs, 
less focus on developing the core 
software as generic platform, projects 
acquired through network of contacts, 
searching for merger as possible 
solution. ‘They abandoned all the 
fancy tools and just used the core 
technology. Instead of offering a 
standardized software product, they 
developed customized solutions.’ 
Apple-
Co 
7 Low perceived environmental 
uncertainty: Research has 
resulted in increased insight in 
opportunities for new apple 
varieties, which reduced 
uncertainty.  
‘The results were phenomenal ... 
So, based on these results, he 
really believed that the consumer 
wanted new and better varieties. 
And that we would be able to 
commercialize them.’ 
Narrowing scope: Start thinking 
of independent R&D entity 
focused on generating 
commercial products.  
‘Now we are both doing this in a 
very primitive way. Perhaps we 
should join forces and see what 
comes out of it; organize 
ourselves as a dedicated, 
commercial R&D center.’  
 
 
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
increases. Increase of causal logic 
towards goals. First project executed, 
business further developed and 
focused, partners acquired in line with 
goals, further investment round, IP 
rights clarified, etc. ‘We started 
talking to the technology transfer 
office and to potential investors to set 
up a commercial R&D center.’ ‘The 
IP rights were transferred from the 
university to AppleCo.’ 
 19 Low perceived resource position 
of the venture/ High stakeholder 
pressures: Need for new 
investment leads to abandonment 
of focus on genetic modification 
of fruit as this is not accepted by 
investors and to replacement of 
CEO. ‘The fruit auctions, which 
were considered the most 
appropriate future investors, 
disapproved of the biotech 
orientation of AppleCo.’  
Widening of scope: Decision to 
focus less on biotech sector. 
‘A new business plan was 
developed with less focus on 
genetic modification. We opened 
up to traditional breeding 
techniques.’  
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. Effectuation as a reaction 
to unforeseen market and investor 
reluctance: new idea co-developed 
with new CEO, new partners and new 
employees from the venture’s 
informal network. ‘Given the 
European reluctance towards 
genetically modified food and the 
difficulties we had in attracting 
investors, we decided to diversify our 
activities.’ 
 40 Low perceived environmental Narrowing of scope: Research Effectuation decreases, Causation 
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uncertainty: Substantial interest 
from fruit growers, which 
reduces uncertainty.  
‘We successfully launched our 
third apple variety in Europe and 
beyond.’ 
into non-income generating 
business (disease resistance) 
abandoned, focus on core 
business (fruit quality). 
‘Research on disease resistance 
of apples diminished, as it gave 
very slow results and often came 
at the cost of fruit quality. We 
decided to focus instead on fruit 
quality’ 
increases. More causal logic to pursue 
goals: IP rights secured for core 
business, buyout of one of the 
founders due to disagreements over 
focus.  
‘We bought a range of patent rights 
which fit our business focus.’ 
Energy
Co 
18 High perceived environmental 
uncertainty: Dependency on 
government decisions creates 
need to develop company to 
explore modes of diversification 
along the product lines and 
markets. ‘This [regulation] is a 
structural risk of [company]. The 
company has tried to reduce the 
risk by expanding in 
international markets as well as 
by diversifying its portfolio.’ 
Widening of scope: Project-by-
project structure in one 
technology is being turned into a 
more diversified portfolio. ‘A 
weakness that we [bank] see is 
the dependency from policy .... 
Whereas [company] works 
against that with broadening its 
position around wind, biomass 
and water power.’ 
Effectuation remains stable, 
Causation decreases. Growing into a 
real company means developing the 
business by enlarging the existing 
portfolio. Focus turns from mere 
project management in one technology 
to a broader opportunity search. 
‘[company] chose to create joint 
ventures with municipal energy 
providers. These joint ventures offered 
them the opportunity to realize 
projects more easily by integrating 
local stakeholders into projects.’ 
Water-
Co 
28 High perceived environmental 
uncertainty and low resource 
position: Competitor addresses 
founders with plans for a major 
IP law-suit that threatens the 
existence of the company. ‘They 
[competitor] really put money to 
that. They procured our products 
through a dummy company, 
picked them to pieces and 
prepared a big patent lawsuit.’ 
Widening of scope: Leave plans 
for business operations and 
development behind and redirect 
the focus to crisis management in 
reaction to actions of competitors 
in the market.  
‘When we got sued, all the VCs 
that we were negotiating with 
jumped off. So we had to think 
of something new.’ 
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. They start collecting and 
checking a variety of options, finally 
looking for partners in order to find 
other ways to stay in business.  
‘For example, I just went to the 
ministry of economic affairs asking 
whether they could do something to 
keep the technology in the country.’ 
Travel-
Co 
11 High perceived stakeholder 
pressure: Business angel 
investors bring operational 
know-how to the venture and ask 
to define and realize business 
model. ‘The investors committed 
to further investments if the 
business development went 
according to business plan 
forecast.’ 
Narrowing of scope: Start 
carrying out market research for 
positioning.  
‘Strategically, our primary target 
market segment for was the 
business-to-consumer market.’  
Effectuation decreases, Causation 
increases. A clearer positioning allows 
to implement a business model, plan 
and close a strategic partnership and 
thereby grow their activities.  
‘[We] compared existing travel 
services and offered information on 
the travel duration and cost of all 
relevant providers in Germany.’ 
 22 High perceived environmental 
uncertainty: The company is 
threatened by other startups, 
some of which are backed by 
large companies. ‘Bearing in 
mind the risk that one of the big 
players may enter our market 
soon, maybe we should think 
about taking the extra money and 
going international while still 
keeping the remaining shares.’ 
Widening of scope: Trying out 
alternative products and services, 
also internationally.  
‘Selling software and software 
services to intermediaries ... 
could be a source of revenue for 
us. For this area we could use the 
know-how, so I could imagine 
that to become a major business 
in the future.’ 
Effectuation increases, Causation 
decreases. They try out different 
products, always asking what else can 
be done with marketing partners, what 
else can be done with software, where 
else can we go. ‘Despite the existing 
indirect competition between 
[competitor /partner] and [company] 
the two organizations entered into a 
partnership: [competitor/partner] 
providing data for [company].’ 
	  
